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Teaching with Ignatius:  Justice in Pedagogical Practice 
 
Jeffrey L. Wilson 
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy 






The document Justice in the World, released in 1971 by the World Synod of Bishops, is an excellent basis for 
thinking about pedagogical practice in Ignatian higher education as a constellation of acts of justice.  I 
describe here my personal experience (as an ambiguously Catholic faculty member) of teaching an upper 
division ethics course in the core curriculum and contextualize it in terms both of Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises 
and the 1971 Synod document.   
 
 
My title, “Teaching with Ignatius,” probably leads 
you to expect that I will say something about how 
I use Ignatius in my teaching, with suggestions as 
to how you might use him in your teaching, as if 
Ignatius were a tool or instrument one could apply 
fruitfully to that difficult task of pedagogy we face.  
But I mean something rather different by that 
preposition, “with”.  To clarify just what I mean 
by it, I would ask you to consider the case of a 
man or woman who enters one of the religious 
orders founded or inspired by Ignatius.  Such a 
person gains the habit of thinking of himself or 
herself as a companion of Jesus, as someone who 
cultivates a sense of the presence of Jesus in his or 
her life and, at the same time, a sense of his or her 
presence to Jesus, as a part of his life.  And such a 
man or woman once immersed in Ignatian 
spirituality might very well look back at the time 
before this immersion and want to say that Jesus 
had accompanied him or her along the way many 
years before he or she became aware of this 
companionship or became willing to cultivate it.  
This person’s way of being “with Jesus” is, I think, 
very much like my own experience of teaching 
with Ignatius:  there was a specific moment, on 
joining the faculty of a University sponsored by 
three Ignatian-inspired orders, that I began to 
cultivate a companionship with Ignatius in 
anything like a deliberate way, but doing so, I 
quickly discovered that strong affinities existed 
between Ignatius’ ways of teaching and of spiritual 
direction and my own long before I had any 
conception of who Ignatius might be or what he 
might stand for.  So when I write about teaching 
with Ignatius, I do not mean teaching by means of 
him, or using Ignatius in one’s teaching; rather, I 
mean teaching alongside Ignatius, in a growing 
companionship.  What it means to me to write 
about a companionship with Ignatius is that, even 
though my undergraduate and graduate training 
were not in the Ignatian tradition—far from it, 
really—I nevertheless discover again and again 
that there is a harmony between my fundamental 
convictions about teaching, as well as my 
methods, techniques, and habits of teaching, and 
Ignatius’ general approach.  In the eighteen years 
since coming to an Ignatian university, I have 
attended Western Conversations, joined the first 
cohort of the Ignatian Colleagues Program, made 
the Spiritual Exercises, and attended several years 
of conferences of the AJCU Arts and Sciences 
Deans.  The companionship with Ignatius that I 
write about here has continued to unfold more 
and more through each of these interactions, and 
my initial pedagogical affinities with Ignatius have 
been reinforced and have extended into the ways I 
proceed in an academic leadership role. 
 
In order to express as concretely as possible what 
I mean by these affinities, I will spend the greater 
part of my paper outlining the course I have the 
most experience teaching, and, not incidentally, 
the course I consider perhaps closest to the core 
of the mission of a Catholic university of any that 
I know.  The course is simply called “Ethics” and 
represents a core requirement for upper-division 
undergraduates in all our colleges.  Students have 
a choice—to my mind, only an apparent choice—
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between Ethics and Contemporary Moral 
Problems, two courses that differ perhaps in 
emphasis but seldom in their primary content and 
never, in my observation, in their primary intent.  
I teach my own sections of Ethics in such a way 
that contemporary moral problems are very 
present, at least weekly and sometimes daily, so 
that the choice between one course title and the 
other really does virtually constitute for me a 
distinction without a difference.  So I will tell you 
a bit about my own ways of teaching this course 
and the motivations behind them.  It will come 
out during this outlining that the question of justice 
arises at multiple points for me as I teach the 
course, which helps to relate the concerns of this 
paper explicitly to the commitment that Ignatian 
institutions of higher learning have to the 
promotion of justice as a central aspect of the 
service of faith. 
 
I’ll spend most of this paper writing directly about 
the Ethics course.  If you know something about 
Ignatian spirituality, you will have no difficulty, I 
think, in identifying for yourself affinities between 
my approach as I describe it and Ignatius’ views 
and practices.  But I will reserve a few pages at the 
end of the paper to be more explicit about these 
affinities.  Eighteen years ago, I would have 
included a caveat that I was a newcomer to the 
Ignatian tradition, and that others could speak 
more expertly about it.  At this point in my career, 
however, I would not describe myself as a guest in 
the house of Ignatius so much as one of the hosts.  
 
There are two facts of my religious background 
that undoubtedly color my approach to questions 
of pedagogy and spirituality.  These two facts 
bring it about that I do not quite swim in the 
mainstream of Roman Catholic educators, 
although I do believe that they and I swim in 
tributaries of the same river.  The first fact is that I 
am an Episcopalian, which makes me a member 
of what we fondly call “the worldwide Anglican 
communion.”  I suppose we call it this rather than 
“worldwide Anglican Church” because it is not so 
much a single organization with one hierarchical 
authority as it is a federation, one might say, of 
many different churches in increasingly profound 
disagreement with one another, for example over 
women in the priesthood and episcopacy, or 
same-sex marriage and the ordination of 
homosexual priests and bishops, who seldom 
agree on much of anything, but all of whom stand 
in a single tradition of liturgical practice and who 
are, most significantly, in communion with one 
another.  Now, this fact complicates my approach 
to spirituality and pedagogy more than you might 
think.  It is not simply a matter of belonging to a 
different religious tradition and nevertheless 
incorporating as much of the “Catholic” tradition 
as my faith and conscience will allow into my 
teaching.  No, indeed, I am one of those 
Anglicans who are quite convinced that we are 
members of the Catholic Church, just not of its 
specifically Roman branch.  And I do not mean 
(to be honest, I get tired of answering the question 
whether I do mean) “catholic” with a small “c”, 
just referring to the universal Christian Church 
that would be thought of as including anyone who 
identifies himself or herself as a Christian.  No, I 
mean Catholic with a big “C”, bigger, I would say, 
than some Roman Catholics are accustomed to 
writing, the Catholic Church whose priests and 
bishops (many of whom now are women and 
homosexual) stand in an unbroken succession 
from Jesus through the Apostles.  I mention this 
conviction of mine not (at least, not only) to be 
provocative, but to point out that it places me in 
an awkward position of speaking, by my own 
opinion, from inside the Catholic Church and 
tradition, at the same time that many (but by no 
means all) Roman Catholics would regard me as 
standing outside that Church and tradition.  The 
awkwardness of this position sometimes leads to 
absurd predicaments that would be comical if they 
were not so discouraging, such as the conversation 
I had with a student who insisted that however 
much the Anglicans might believe in the 
resurrection of the body, “real Catholics” believe 
that only the soul survives death.  What could I, 
an “unreal” Catholic, answer to such a claim? 
 
The second fact of my religious life that colors my 
pedagogy is that I came to Catholicism rather late, 
at the end of college, having been raised as a 
fundamentalist Southern Baptist.  I think I can 
best express my present relation to that tradition 
by telling a quick story.  At one point many years 
ago, I was in Germany, where a trained ear can 
almost always detect what region someone comes 
from by the dialect of the German language that 
person uses.  I make a little hobby of guessing 
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where people are from on this basis.  But I was 
faced one day with someone who said he was 
“from Munich” but who didn’t have the 
unmistakable Bavarian color to his speech.  After 
he assured me that he really was born in Munich, I 
said, “then you must have unlearned your 
language.”  His answer was, “I didn’t unlearn it; I 
took it to a higher stage of development.”1  The 
point of my telling the story is that I’d say the 
same thing about my evangelical Protestant 
upbringing:  I haven’t unlearned it; I’ve taken it to 
a higher stage of development.  By this I mean, 
for example, that I am still Protestant in the sense 
that I believe that some members of the Church 
hierarchy make claims for their authority over the 
faith and practice of other Christians that cannot 
be justified by Scripture, tradition, or reason.  This 
does not make me a Protestant but a Protestant 
Catholic (a term that, incidentally, despite its 
sounding contradictory to modern ears, can be 
accurately applied to Martin Luther himself), a 
voice that is both a voice from within and a 
critical voice, critical most particularly of injustice 
within the Church itself. 
 
One of the injustices of today’s Church is that her 
young people are woefully ill-informed about the 
Church.  One act of justice that we as teachers can 
perform is simply to provide these students with 
accurate information when such subjects come up.  
I have already given the example of the Roman 
Catholic student who is certain that “his” Church 
does not believe in the resurrection of the body.  
That misunderstanding is dangerous enough in 
moral terms, since it would entail that, in order to 
be a Catholic Christian, one would have to hold a 
radical soul/body dualism that would, by 
implication, rule out the doctrine of the 
Incarnation of God in Christ that is at the core of 
Christian teaching.  That is a piece of 
misinformation that is dangerous in theory, but 
probably not that dangerous in practice, since few 
people bother to maintain intellectual consistency 
and even fewer take the trouble to act according 
to such a consistency. 
 
There is, however, another misunderstanding that 
I frequently encounter among my Roman Catholic 
students that is dangerous and unjust in practice.  
This misunderstanding usually comes to light the 
first time a student uses the expression “the 
Catholic position” in one of my classes.  No 
matter what the context, I stop the discussion to 
question this expression.  The student invariably 
means to refer to the official Vatican position, for 
example, the position on birth control.  Taken by 
itself, it is a small matter of verbal imprecision.  
But when I question students further, a much 
more ominous misunderstanding begins to 
become apparent.  Most of my students—and this 
opinion is most widespread among my Roman 
Catholic students—believe that there is only one 
“Catholic” position on moral questions such as 
this, and that a believer who dissents from that 
position automatically excommunicates himself or 
herself from the Church.  These students are 
ignorant of the most fundamental facts of dissent 
in the Church and are shocked momentarily, but 
soon thereafter relieved, in most cases, to learn 
that there are any number of bishops, 
archbishops, and even entire national colleges of 
bishops who dissent from the Vatican position on 
birth control.  Since many of these students do in 
fact dissent from the official position on any 
number of points of doctrine or practice, their 
ignorance of the fact that there can be dissent 
within the Church means that they feel themselves 
forced to leave the Church or at best to feel 
alienated within it by reason of their self-imposed 
silence.  Pointing out the fact that there are 
persons in high positions of authority within the 
Church who dissent from the official Vatican view 
of this or that is an act of justice toward the 
students, since it allows them to retain those 
aspects they can accept of the moral foundation 
the Church provides even in the face of times of 
doubt or points of disagreement, and it is an act of 
justice toward the Church, since it helps the 
Church to retain the dissenting voices that serve 
as the engine of change that no human institution 
can survive without.  What this form of justice has 
to do with Ignatius will gradually emerge as my 
paper develops. 
 
Since the Second Vatican Council, there has been 
much discussion in the Church and among the 
Jesuits about the preferential option for the poor, 
and some have questioned whether the Church, 
and the Jesuits in particular, should play as large a 
role as they do in educating the wealthy.  I do not 
mean to cheapen the idea of a preferential option 
for the poor but to deepen it when I say that I 
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have the experience, more often than it is 
comfortable to count, of trying to teach the 
intellectually poor, and it is often the children of 
the rich whom I find to be the poorest of the 
intellectually poor.  It is not just that the students 
are ill-informed; much worse is their frequent lack 
of will to become informed, to read books, to read 
newspapers, to watch or listen to television and 
radio news and find out what is going on in the 
world around them.  In my experience, the kid 
from Beverly Hills High is less likely to pick up a 
newspaper than the kid from South Central Los 
Angeles.  They are also less likely to be registered 
to vote or to know how to vote when election day 
comes.  This is not just an informational poverty 
but an impoverishment of will that I try to address 
in my Ethics course in its root causes.   
 
What does cause this impoverishment of will?  I 
got a lesson in this one day early in my teaching 
career when I mentioned the decades-long North 
Korean famine in class, noting that the country 
would be facing a generation of citizens who are 
irretrievably brain-damaged from prolonged 
malnutrition.  I also pointed out what seemed to 
me the logical consequence:  that a whole 
generation of teachers, scientists, business leaders, 
etc., would have to come from abroad while the 
government cared for these grown-up children of 
famine in institutions.  My point was that the 
policies of North Korean leaders would result in a 
crippling of the country’s economic structure, a 
prediction that has sadly, been fulfilled in great 
measure.   But as I was drawing this consequence, 
a visibly angry student shouted at me from the 
second row of seats:  “Why are you talking about 
this?  I don’t want to hear about it!  It just makes 
me sad.  It has nothing to do with me, and I can’t 
do anything about it!”  Of course, I was shocked, 
but I did what I could to explain patiently that an 
American foreign policy reaching back over 
decades had played a role in the famine, that 
foreign policy is made and executed primarily by 
our President, that citizens of legal majority have 
the privilege of voting for Presidents and 
congressional representatives, and that it is 
possible for a voter to get a pretty clear sense of a 
candidate’s foreign policy objectives from media 
reports prior to the election.  In other words, it 
does have something to do with you, and you can 
do something about it.  If I am not mistaken, that 
student began reading the newspaper, and she 
started asking questions in class about how her 
actions could affect the things she was reading 
about. 
 
What was behind this student’s new willingness to 
learn was also a change in her self-understanding. 
She was not previously accustomed to thinking of 
herself as a moral agent, as someone who can 
initiate actions that have potentially global 
consequences, and who can deliberate rationally 
both about the ends or moral principles of such 
actions and about the means used to reach those 
ends.  This change in the students’ self-
understanding is my primary goal in the Ethics 
course.  I view this goal as an act of justice 
towards the students, a preferential option for the 
intellectually poor, if you will.  Our students live in 
a society that treats them (I should write:  all of 
us) primarily as consumers of products and 
services.  This treatment threatens to reduce the 
human person to someone who chooses among 
preselected options on the basis of liking one of 
the options more than the others.  And trends of 
fashion take away most of even this radically 
impoverished latitude for choice; one is only 
allowed to like what one is told it is currently 
fashionable to like.  Even the “nonconformist” 
has his or her accepted uniform. 
 
I consider it one of the most urgent imperatives of 
justice in education for us not to treat our students 
as consumers.  Of course, I require them to read 
Aristotle, Mill, and Kant, and some combination 
of Cicero and Kierkegaard and perhaps Foucault; 
and I ask them to know something about these 
authors’ positions on moral questions.  But these 
are tools toward a larger purpose:  that of inviting 
and training students to think for themselves 
about moral questions, to form reasoned opinions 
about them and to find ways of putting them into 
practice.  Too many of our students are quite 
willing to form opinions about moral issues but 
not reasoned opinions.  This stems from their 
failure to think of themselves as reasoners.  This 
failure does not begin with them; it is already 
present in the larger society that acts as if it needs 
them less as reasoners than as consumers, and it is 
perpetuated all too often in an educational sector 
that treats students as consumers of information 
rather than as agents of moral judgment.  (If 
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professors are information-delivery devices, the 
day is not far off when we will find ourselves 
regulated by the intellectual-property equivalent of 
the FDA.) 
 
The texts for the Ethics course are fairly 
standardized.  It is customary in my department to 
use Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Kant’s 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and John 
Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism, but there are variations.  
One colleague, for example, relies almost 
exclusively on Aristotle; another uses an ethics 
textbook that has selections from many authors.  I 
do use the three customary texts, with any number 
of twists of my own.  One is that I have the 
students read the texts in a reverse chronological 
order:  reverse because Mill’s utilitarianism is 
closer than Kant’s formalism or Aristotelian 
virtues ethics to the ethical arguments the students 
are already familiar with from the media and the 
society around them.  It simply makes for more 
effective teaching to lead the students from what 
is more familiar to them to what is less familiar. 
 
One standard approach I am careful to avoid is 
that of presenting Aristotle, Kant, and Mill as if 
they were three possible options for moral 
evaluation that are mutually exclusive and which 
students must choose among.  If it is a key 
element of justice toward our students to treat 
them as rationally deliberative moral agents, then 
it is also essential to avoid this trap.  The 
alternative is to allow each of these authors to 
come alive and teach the students the power of his 
particular approach to moral reflection.  I do not 
try to get a student to identify as Aristotelian, 
Kantian, or utilitarian; rather, I encourage each 
student to find elements of each thinker that he or 
she can use in moral deliberation.  I will say more 
on this point when I come to the term paper 
assignment. 
 
I also include Cicero’s De officiis on my reading list 
(the Latin title means On Duties).  I have any 
number of reasons for doing this.  One is that, 
although my doctoral training and my research has 
been chiefly as a specialist on Kant, I think Kant is 
far too often cast as a proponent of a radical 
modernity that breaks clearly from the classical 
tradition of moral reflection.  There is good 
evidence that Kant had Christian Garve’s German 
translation of De officiis before him while writing 
the Groundwork, and an attentive listener can hear 
many Ciceronian resonances in Kant’s text.  
Having the students read Cicero gives them a 
chance to eavesdrop on a subtle dialogue between 
a modern thinker and an ancient one and to see 
that this language of “ancient” and “modern” 
conceals as much of continuity as it reveals of 
contrast. 
 
It’s true, also, that Mill responds to Kant, although 
not in the same way that Kant responds to Cicero.  
Kant is a subtle reader of Cicero and, while not 
naming him explicitly, responds on quite a deep 
level to his thought.  Mill does name Kant 
explicitly, but Mill’s “Kant” is a caricature that 
contains a long list of demonstrably mistaken 
interpretations of Kant’s ethics.  Mill thus 
provides a convenient example of how badly we 
often listen to one another in conversations about 
ethical principles.  Having seen Mill practice this 
distorted representation of Kant’s position trains 
students to police one another in their group 
discussions for just this kind of distortion of one 
another’s positions.  I will come back briefly to 
these group discussions after some additional 
remarks on the reading assignments and my 
general teaching strategy. 
 
My most fundamental reason for choosing to read 
Cicero with the Ethics students is his central 
moral category of decorum, sometimes translated as 
“propriety”.  Other possible English equivalents 
might be tact or consistency; the characteristically 
German virtue of Konsequenz is almost certainly 
derived from Cicero’s decorum.  I try to get Cicero’s 
ideas across through the sense of fit:  decorum has 
to do with what fits (or what is appropriate to) a 
human being as such, as well as what fits in a 
particular person’s life story as a whole and what 
fits with his or her present stage of life, position, 
resources, etc.  I appreciate Cicero’s sensitivity to 
the most minute particularities and contingencies 
of a person’s life—and, indeed, Cicero is one of 
few moral philosophers who can articulate how 
something as apparently trivial as the clothes one 
wears could be seen as a moral issue--but I have a 
deeper reason for bringing him into the moral 
conversation.  Decorum cannot be judged by reason 
and can therefore not be argued about.  It relies 
on a sensibility that bridges the moral to the 
Wilson: Teaching with Ignatius 
 
 Jesuit Higher Education 2(1): 99-111 (2013) 104 
aesthetic and helps to make the case for the 
importance of imagination in moral life.  Cicero 
teaches students to respect their most deeply-felt 
intuitions about moral appropriateness, even when 
those intuitions are not verbally articulated or, in 
some cases, articulable.  Cicero also helps in this 
way to avoid the pitfall of believing that since 
reason can clarify some elements (viz., the rational 
elements) of moral decision-making, it can actually 
make moral decisions.  I emphasize to students 
from Day One of the course that there is no 
moral decision that we can make on the basis of 
reason alone, without the help of imagination, 
judgment, and ultimately of faith.  What moral 
philosophy can do is to help avoid certain 
mistakes in our moral reasoning; it cannot replace 
the nonrational parts of the ethical decision.  At 
the same time, the greater danger here is not that 
the students will become ethical rationalists but that 
they will revert to an ethical irrationalism.  This 
happens when ethics teachers make exaggerated 
claims for the power of reason to solve moral 
problems, and then students become disillusioned 
with reason itself when these claims prove to be 
empty.  Curbing students’ expectations of moral 
philosophy is thus an essential element of justice 
toward them, since it helps them to preserve and 
value their rational capacities while not giving 
them exclusive pride of place in the human 
person. 
 
I’ll make just two more comments about reading 
assignments.  I admitted already that I am a Kant 
specialist by training, and, as you might expect, I 
do spend an unusually large chunk of time on 
Kant in my Ethics course.  This is not, however, 
because I think Kant represents the pinnacle of 
moral philosophy.  I would much sooner say that 
Aristotle represents such a pinnacle, so that my 
reverse chronological order allows me to end the 
course with the richest and most nuanced moral 
treatise I know:  the Nicomachean Ethics.  No, the 
comprehensiveness of my use of Kant in this 
course (indeed, he sneaks somehow into every 
course I teach) stems from my desire to offer the 
students the best that I have, the best example that 
I can give of a careful, well-informed reading of a 
philosopher, without the claim that it is the best 
there is.  In fact, my knowledge of Kant and my 
sympathy with Aristotle make me probably most 
well-disposed toward thinkers like Maréchal and 
Lonergan who, as I understand it, attempt to 
converse with Kant from their base in the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.  The very 
existence of Maréchal and Lonergan as authors 
within the Catholic intellectual tradition falsifies 
the unjust claim that one must choose between 
Catholic moral thought and the “modernity” 
represented by Kant, with no possibility of 
thoughtful mediation. 
 
Recognizing such false dichotomies is naturally a 
part of any Ethics course.  As I’ve said already, I 
make it a goal to incorporate contemporary moral 
problems at every turn.  One that always comes 
up (because I cannot remain silent about it) is the 
death penalty.  When I poll students, the 
overwhelming majority of them believe the press 
hype that tells them that the majority of 
Americans favor the death penalty.  (I read the 
same hype in German papers, and when I do, the 
author and editor get a sharply-worded letter from 
me.  One of those letters even elicited a response.)  
When the issue comes up, we take a close look at 
the wording of the pollsters’ questions.  One such 
poll question (typical, so far as I know) runs 
something like this:  Do you think a serial killer 
and rapist should (a) be executed, or (b) go free?  
It is no surprise that most Americans (more than 
70%, as I remember) choose execution when 
offered this false dichotomy.  At least one 
alternative polling agency found that all it took for 
the pro-death penalty responses to drop well 
below fifty percent was to offer pollees the third 
alternative of life imprisonment.  Laws are made 
as a result of which lives—sometimes innocent 
lives—are lost on the basis of a misplaced respect 
for statistics, when a careful scrutiny of the way 
poll questions are posed could lead to a more just 
result.  The injustice in this case is multiple.  Of 
course, the greatest injustice is that innocent lives 
are lost.  But there is the additional injustice of 
pollsters and the media not just reporting public 
opinion but distorting and manipulating it.  And 
the very claim that the majority of American 
citizens favor the death penalty is unjust to that 
very majority who record such an opinion only 
when offered a false dichotomy.  I try with 
examples like this to encourage students to grasp 
that if they want to play some role in enacting 
justice in the world, they don’t just need the 
“right” moral theory (or, God forbid, the 
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arrogance that comes with that expression, “the 
moral high ground”).  They need to read the 
newspapers and to do so critically, which probably 
means knowing something not just about 
journalism but about history and inferential 
statistics as well. 
 
I use the early sessions of the Ethics course to lay 
out a set of concrete examples, both to get 
students to see the need for moral philosophy and 
to get them to explore initially their own sense of 
what is morally right and wrong.  I choose 
examples that are close to the students’ everyday 
lives but which, at the same time, demonstrate 
something of the complexity of moral 
deliberation.  One example I frequently use is the 
decision whether to give money to a street beggar.  
Of course, the students give a variety of 
responses.  Then ask I ask them to identify factors 
that might affect their decision:  What if the 
person appears drunk, has a small child, or 
appears too well-off to be begging?  Then I ask 
what principle the students have used to make their 
decision.  Most are not aware of having used a 
principle at all; they felt their way through the 
problem holistically.  In itself, this does not appear 
problematic, especially if the response was 
charitable or compassionate.  But it is, in fact, 
tragic if the holistic, emotive approach to the 
problem makes it impossible to articulate any 
principles at all—tragic, because if we cannot 
speak about moral problems, we cannot learn 
from one another’s experiences, insights, and 
deliberations.  This is the state of splendid and 
depressing moral isolation that most of our 
students find themselves in upon entering an 
Ethics course.  And this isolation becomes 
untenable precisely at the point where the student 
discovers a moral problem he or she does not 
have the resources to settle alone and does not 
have the language to carry on a moral discourse 
with others about in which their perspectives 
could be added to his or her own, or, in the 
extreme case, to interact with the student’s own 
views in such a way as to alter them.  Helping 
students to articulate moral principles, however 
clumsily at first, is a matter of justice, since it is 
only in this way that the human moral 
conversation becomes open to them, and it is only 
in this way that their voices become available to 
the larger human moral conversation. 
 
After we stumble over the problem of moral 
principles, I take the students through an exercise 
that helps them begin to articulate principles.  I 
ask them to imagine all of the possible different 
responses to the beggar’s request.  They had at 
first thought only in terms of the false dichotomy, 
to give or not to give cash.  On my prodding, 
students begin to propose other possibilities:  to 
give food, to engage in a friendly conversation, 
etc.  But I am usually the one who has to come up 
with the more outlandish options:  shouting 
obscenities at the beggar or even engaging in 
physical violence.  Students want to insist at first 
that these are impossible, I suppose partly on the 
basis of the expression heard all too frequently, 
“That’s not an option.”  Never mind the fact that 
what most often follows this expression is a 
“because,” which tells us why this particular 
option has already been ruled out.  My point is 
that it is often these perfectly outrageous 
alternatives for action that turn out to be the most 
helpful in articulating our moral principles.  If we 
can say why it is that we are so certain that 
inflicting blows on a person who asks us for help 
is wrong, we may then have found the very 
principle we need to decide among the not-so-
outrageous alternatives.  For example, if we say 
that it is a matter of human dignity, that it is, after 
all, an interaction between one human being and 
another, then this may help us see that, for 
example, throwing some coins on the ground for 
the beggar is less consistent with human dignity 
than saying “Good morning” but giving nothing.  
I do not mean this as a solution of the problem, 
only as an example of how we discover and 
articulate principles.  The purpose is to induce a 
process of moral reflection, not to determine the 
outcome of the process.  Apart from this basic 
purpose, the exercise also cultivates the students’ 
imagination for alternatives, in keeping with my 
conviction that it is a serious moral problem not 
to be able to imagine that there even could be a 
response different from the one I and those 
around me typically give.  I try to impress upon 
students that there is a moral advantage to 
learning a foreign language or experiencing a 
foreign culture on its own turf:  these actions help 
us to imagine that it is possible to live otherwise.  
And I, at least, find concrete examples of this 
among my own students:  bilingual and bicultural 
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students display, in my observation, a higher 
degree of moral imagination precisely because 
they think and live in two cultures at once.  It is 
probably as difficult for these students to imagine 
that there are those who think there’s only one 
way of saying or doing something as it is for our 
monolingual, monocultural students to imagine 
alternate ways of living and speaking. 
 
My favorite story of such a lack of imagination 
comes from the first few years of my teaching 
while still a graduate student at Emory University 
in Atlanta.  One of my sharpest students engaged 
me in conversation one day to ask me about my 
personal goals.  He was puzzled, because he 
thought that I was of at least above-average 
intelligence, and he couldn’t understand why I 
would go into a career with as little financial 
promise as university teaching.  “Dr. Wilson,” he 
asked, “don’t you have any goals?”  When I 
answered, “Sure, I have goals, just not financial 
ones,” he countered, “I’m not aware that there are 
any non-financial goals.”  Of course, the truth was 
that he was not aware—I wish I could write “not 
yet aware”, but I do not know this—of the non-
financial goals he carries in his own heart. 
 
Leading students toward insight into their own 
most heartfelt goals is much more of an art than a 
science, and I am convinced that it has a great deal 
in common with spiritual direction as manifest in 
the Spiritual Exercises.  I will devote the final pages 
of my paper to a brief exploration of these 
affinities (I am sure you have guessed some of 
them already), but before I do so, I want to 
remark briefly on the three main tools I use in the 
course in the attempt to produce these insights. 
 
First, there is the daily format of the class on 
Mondays and Wednesdays.  I do not formally 
lecture in this course except when reviewing for 
an exam.  One reason for this is simply that I was 
not taught by lecture but by discussion from 
freshman year forward.  (I did my undergraduate 
work at St. John’s, Annapolis, the so-called Great 
Books school.)  I had never even observed the 
lecture format until graduate school, when I was 
teaching assistant for several professors who 
taught in this way.  What I saw then was very 
instructive—and discouraging.  It was typical for 
the professor to come in and summarize the 
simplest parts of the text that anyone who had 
actually read it would already have understood, to 
remain silent about the difficult passages, and to 
discourage questions in order to “get on with the 
material”.  This had two disastrous effects:  it 
actually discouraged students from reading, and 
when the time came for a planned discussion day, 
the students had so clearly heard the message that 
their voices were unwelcome that they remained 
silent, and the professor was left frustrated and 
angry, not understanding that the students were 
simply doing what he or she had trained them to 
do.  Lecturing is often touted as an efficient 
means of communicating information, but in the 
cases I saw, at least, it was the least efficient means 
of learning, especially in philosophy, where we are 
not primarily in the business of communicating 
information but of teaching skills (for lack of a 
better term) of thought and insight. 
 
I have never found the perfect remedy for this 
problem.  The one thing I do consistently, day 
after day, is to find out from the students how 
much they have been able to understand of the 
text already and where they’ve encountered 
difficulties, so that I can concentrate my work on 
those aspects of the text they have not been able 
to grasp on their own.  My mechanism for doing 
this is to assign a student or a small group of 
students to come prepared to present, in five to 
ten minutes, the text for the day, and this 
presentation begins our discussion.  This makes 
our work much more efficient, since even if the 
presenter has badly misunderstood the text, this 
shows me that someone in his or her position can 
misunderstand the text in just this way, and I can 
direct my interventions toward just this 
misunderstanding.  I do not worry a great deal 
about “covering” material; I would point out, with 
an experienced translator’s sensitivity to language, 
that it is not our job to cover material but to 
uncover it for the students or, better, to teach them 
to uncover it for themselves.  These metaphors do 
mean something, whether we use them 
deliberately or not.  Even the more standard 
signification of “covering” in this context—that of 
covering ground or territory—is  disastrous, since 
it implies putting land or road or what have you 
behind us, and what we want in the classroom is to 
make certain questions and possible answers 
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present before our students and to keep them 
present. 
 
And I have a deeper agenda behind assigning 
these presentations which, incidentally, I use with 
both my freshmen and upper-division majors..  
They force the students, at least a few times 
during the semester, to encounter the difficult 
primary texts we read on their own.  This is a 
traumatic experience for many of them, since they 
are convinced that they cannot make any sense 
out of Aristotle or Kant without help.  One of my 
central goals is to show them, first, that they do 
have some resources of their own for reading and 
understanding such texts, then, to use the class 
discussions to refine the tools they already 
possess.  If this is the goal, it is crucial for me not 
to summarize the texts for them, since this 
perpetuates the idea that I am the producer of 
knowledge and they are the consumers, which 
would leave them in precisely the state of 
dependence I want to lead them out of in order to 
read and think for themselves.  This agenda means 
that I do not have to exercise much discipline to 
keep up the pace of the discussion and keep us 
moving from one point to another so that we are 
sure to “finish”.  Instead, my discipline consists of 
making certain that our discussions are always 
substantial and relevant, but once that condition is 
met, I can let them be as fragmentary or slow as 
they need to be.  However, the next class period, 
we always move on to the next reading 
assignment.  I might allow myself five minutes of 
remarks as transition.  We are always on schedule.  
The main reason I insist on this is that the 
students’ participation is crucial to the course.  In 
order to participate, they must be prepared, and in 
order to prepare, they must know exactly what to 
expect on a particular day, preferably well in 
advance.  These Monday and Wednesday classes 
prepare students for an essay midterm and final, 
when I ask them to discuss the texts in a 
substantial and relevant way, but without any 
demand for completeness.  The one proviso is 
that they must be able to write about each of the 
texts in a way that indicates they’ve not derived 
their understanding of it solely from our 
discussions, which means they actually have to do 
the readings. 
 
Fridays I reserve for small group discussions.  The 
overall purpose is to prepare students to write 
their final papers applying ethical theories to the 
solution of a concrete moral decision of their 
choice.  Early in the semester, I assign a decision 
for groups to consider; later, individual students 
introduce their chosen paper topics for discussion 
by the group.  The main benefit of the small 
group discussions is that the students learn to 
carry on a rational debate with persons whose 
moral positions differ from their own.  Any claim 
is allowed, even if it is offensive to someone else 
in the group; I allow no one to be silenced.  The 
provision I make is that anyone who makes a 
moral claim must be willing to defend it with 
reasons and willing to consider, on the basis of 
reasons offered by others, altering his or her view.  
Many students believe they cannot converse with 
persons whose views they consider offensive; 
some believe that this is not possible at all—like 
the black students who begged me at the 
beginning of one Ethics section please to avoid 
discussions of racism, because they thought no 
good could possibly come of such conversations.  
But by the midpoint of every term, the small 
groups are managing to have the very discussions 
they initially thought were too dangerous or even 
impossible.  
 
There is a question of justice here as well.  The 
male student, for example, who began his group 
participation by articulating views about women 
that were offensive to almost everyone present 
had not thought through these views for himself.  
He had heard them from someone in his family or 
social group.  His only opportunity to revise his 
views, which he slowly began to do, was to be 
made a part of a discussion in which he was 
allowed to begin by voicing these offensive views.  
It was an act of justice toward him not to deprive 
him of this opportunity.  The other members of 
the group (the overwhelming majority, in fact) 
who were offended by his initial remarks were not, 
I would argue, injured by them.  Instead, they 
learned that silencing the offending party is not as 
powerful as calling him or her to account for the 
views with reasons everyone can understand.  The 
“political correctness” that responds to offensive 
speech by excluding the offenders from the moral 
conversation only makes the views more extreme.  
It is the equivalent of locking up those who 
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commit petty crimes and offering no 
opportunities for education or reform:  we should 
not be surprised when the result is a hardened 
criminal or a confirmed bigot, misogynist, etc., 
who is then invulnerable to better influences.  
From the other side, the gay or lesbian student, 
for example, who has seen the possibility of 
influencing a homophobic classmate toward a 
different view through open and rational 
discussion leaves the course with a new reserve of 
hope, whatever the initial sting of having to hear 
the offensive remarks.  I would argue that it is 
unjust to deprive him or her of this hope through 
an exaggerated protective solicitude. 
 
I have students write two preliminary drafts of 
their final papers.  I review and comment on one 
of the drafts; another is critiqued by a fellow 
student.  The process of critique and revision 
offers multiple opportunities for insight.  For 
example, when critiquing a classmate’s paper, a 
student often realizes for the first time why 
professors write the comments they do on his or 
her own papers, and students often find 
themselves following the advice they themselves 
have given in their critique as a way of improving 
their own work.  But the insights are not always 
just academic.  One student chose as her moral 
decision what career she should pursue.  Her 
parents wanted her to be a physician; her talents 
were artistic, but she thought that pursuing these 
talents would be selfish.  I wrote very brief 
comments on her draft, pointing out that while 
doctors certainly save lives, it is rash to assume 
that artists do not.  That led to a conversation 
where I shared our University Physician’s insight 
with her that many people die not of physical 
causes but of spiritual ones, such as the person 
with AIDS who skips his medications because he’s 
depressed.  One way of describing artists, I think, 
is as doctors who deal in the spiritual causes of 
disease, those causes that tap into soul and 
imagination and those sources of life that will 
always remain mysterious to medical science.  
Well, the student dropped out of pre-med studies 
to major in art, and one short comment on one 
paper draft was instrumental to her decision.  It is 
a matter of justice to lead our students to the 
insight that their own gifts have an intrinsic worth 
that does not depend on any comparative 
evaluation with careers and talents that someone 
regards as objectively more valuable. 
 
As a final remark before turning to the Ignatian 
resonances, I want to comment on the very idea 
of Ethics as an upper-division core requirement.  
One of my first interactions with the students in 
these classes occurs when I ask them whether it 
irritates them to have their specialized work in 
their major interrupted by such a requirement.  
Many are willing to say that it does, especially if I 
allow them to think for a moment that I might 
sympathize with their irritation.  Then I explain to 
them why we interrupt them in this way:  after they 
have already begun to actualize themselves as 
potential bankers, doctors, lawyers, business 
leaders, artists, engineers, filmmakers, we call them 
back and address them again as human persons, to 
remind them that they are not their work, that it is 
only out of the core of themselves as whole 
persons that they can accomplish worthwhile 
work.  In a society where it seems that what you 
“do for a living”—and therefore what quality and 
quantity of commercial goods and services you are 
able to consume—defines who you are, it is a 
crucial act of justice to treat our students with an 
eye to their intrinsic worth as persons and to teach 
them to be attentive to this non-commercial 
worth in themselves and others and in the world 
around them. 
 
In The First Jesuits, John O’Malley quotes Ignatius’ 
secretary, Juan Alfonso de Polanco, as saying that 
the director of the Spiritual Exercises should not be 
too directive, because “individuals will more 
deeply relish what they discover for themselves.”2  
As you have surely already grasped, this is a 
principle I use in the Ethics course as well; the 
main point is to induce and empower the students 
to discover in classic texts as well as in themselves 
principles of moral deliberation.  O’Malley also 
notes that Jesuit education has sought from the 
beginning “to move the student beyond pious 
practices to an inner appropriation of ethical and 
religious values.3  I do my best to construct the 
course in such a way as to foster this inner 
appropriation as my primary goal. 
 
David Lonsdale notes that Ignatius’ autobiography 
makes clear that “experience was the main catalyst 
of change in his life”4 and that spiritual 
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discernment was always based for him on 
reflection on his own experience.  This reflection 
would always contain for him consolations and 
desolations, attractions and revulsions.  A good 
Ethics instructor, like a good spiritual director, 
first lets the students know that these inner 
movements are a normal, expected, and salutary 
part of the process of reflection, and then 
monitors the students’ states of mind as they 
progress.  One of the reasons I have hesitated to 
become involved in online teaching is that I feel a 
need to be physically in the same room with my 
students, see how they sit, how they make or 
avoid eye contact, how they interact with others, 
etc., in order to be attentive to the moments when 
my intervention becomes imperative.  Usually it is 
a matter of waiting for a student who has become 
troubled by the process of reflection to come to 
me, but by the time this happens, I am seldom 
surprised by the fact that the student is troubled 
or even by the nature of the disturbance, since I 
am a careful reader of the non-verbal language my 
students speak.  I imagine that I would encounter 
similar difficulties in giving an Ethics course over 
the Internet as an Ignatian priest or religious 
would encounter when giving the Spiritual Exercises 
in this way.  Even if there is a live video link, is the 
color transmission sensitive enough to show me 
how a student’s face pales in a discussion when a 
classmate asks an uncomfortable question?  These 
questions do not speak against teaching or 
offering spiritual direction online; they merely 
represent special challenges to be overcome.  
Technology such as social media may offer 
important advantages over traditional forms of 
communication in the ways that they incorporate 
visual media more intensively, make possible 
immediate responses to immediate problems, and 
automatically keep a visible record of changes 
over time. 
 
Ignatius’ concern to adapt the Spiritual Exercises 
“to the temperament and talent of his listeners”5 
presupposes that he must have been attentive to 
the differences in talent and temperament among 
his listeners.  My approach of basing any lecturing 
I do on questions and confusions in student 
presentations reflects this same attentiveness.  
This, too, is a question of justice, since giving 
equal access to education does not simply mean 
allowing students of all backgrounds to be 
physically present in our classrooms.  It must also 
mean becoming aware of who our students are 
and matching examples, metaphors, study 
questions, and all sorts of teaching techniques to 
the students we have rather than to some ideal 
student we (probably misguidedly) wish that we 
had. 
 
This attentiveness to who our students actually are 
is a first step toward drawing them into the life of 
a community.  The fact that Ignatius and the 
Spiritual Exercises have given rise to the fraternal 
community of the Society of Jesus as well as, less 
directly, to several women’s orders6 points to a 
connection between spiritual direction and 
community.  The relevant community in the case 
of the Ethics course is the community of moral 
discourse, where each of us is not left solely to his 
or her own meager resources of experience and 
reflection to make moral decisions.  Instead, 
conversation about moral issues makes it possible 
to leave this isolation, to borrow experiences and 
tools of reflection from others, and yet to preserve 
the identity of one’s inwardness.7 
 
The emphasis Ignatius places on imagination in 
the Exercises generates another suggestion:  that 
the arts, as cultivators of imagination, have a 
leading role to play in moral development.  I am 
always pleased to have fine arts or film or theater 
or music majors in the Ethics class.  They are at 
times less apt (or less patient, anyway) with the 
theoretical aspects of the course, but they are 
trained in an attentiveness to the contingencies of 
life, contingencies that make for a subtle 
differentiation in the way moral principles are 
applied from one nearly identical case to the next.  
Anyone who has tuned a guitar or spoken a line of 
Shakespeare or edited three minutes of video is 
immediately more open to recognizing the 
significance of small differences. 
  
Ignatius writes in his Reminiscences that he made the 
decision to go to Barcelona for the purpose of 
“studying for a time in order to be able to help 
souls.”8  I have puzzled for about a year now over 
the question, What does it mean to study in order 
to be helpful to souls?  I’ve also put the question 
to several Jesuits; neither they nor I have an 
answer that satisfies me.  Of course, the theme of 
service to others that plays a role in every Jesuit 
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university’s mission statement is relevant here.  
But what sort of intellectual training promotes our 
ability to be of service to others?  The only reply I 
have at my ready disposal today is that a good 
Ethics course raises this question, even for the 
business majors, who may think that their only 
goals are financial ones, then find themselves 
puzzled when their management professors, for 
example, talk to them about cultivating 
relationships and about the need for every 
community (including a company) to foster the 
wholeness of the persons who make it up. 
 
In the Spiritual Exercises themselves, I find one 
resonance in the Second Annotation to my way of 
teaching, which demands that the students 
struggle on their own with difficult material, even 
when I could make it much easier, so that they will 
have the experience and satisfaction of 
discovering their ability to read difficult books and 
think difficult thoughts.  The Second Annotation 
enjoins the director to be “brief and summary” 
and to leave as much as possible to self-discovery 
and divine grace.  The reason:  “For it is not so 
much knowledge that fills and satisfies the soul, 
but rather the intimate feeling and relishing of 
things.”9  A simple method of lecturing threatens 
to deprive students unjustly of their “intimate 
feeling and relishing” of their own capacity for 
learning and moral reflection. 
 
In the “Presupposition” to the First Week, 
Ignatius has one of the clearest articulations I’ve 
found of the principle of charitable interpretation:  
“...any good Christian has to be more ready to 
justify than to condemn a neighbor’s statement.  If 
no justification can be found, one should ask the 
neighbor in what sense it should be taken, and if 
that sense is wrong he or she should be corrected 
lovingly.”10  The relevant “neighbors” for the 
Ethics course are the authors of the assigned 
readings as well as one’s fellow students.  A 
charitable reading in the former case is necessary 
in order for the students to get as much worth out 
of these authors as possible for their own moral 
reflection.  In the latter case, it is necessary 
because of the truth that we teachers seldom 
admit willingly: the students learn more from one 
another than they do from us.  Reserving Fridays 
for small group discussions is one way I 
acknowledge this truth; I do this in order to try, as 
far as possible, to place this mutual learning at the 
center of the students’ institutionalized education.  
There is also a question of justice at play here, 
combined with a type of humility that does not 
come easily to any teacher.  The ability to learn 
from one another in moral conversation is a skill 
that can tremendously enrich our students’ later 
lives.  The skill of attentive listening and note-
taking to lectures on ethics is one that is not likely 
to be called for again once they graduate. 
 
In closing, and with apologies for my somewhat 
fragmentary treatment of Ignatian spirituality, I 
want to sound just a few notes from Justice in the 
World, the document of the 1971 Synod of 
Bishops that has proven so influential in 
articulating the Church’s renewed commitment to 
justice.  The bishops declare that “education 
demands a renewal of heart....  It will likewise 
awaken a critical sense.”11  I suppose the renewal 
of heart I try to produce in students has to do 
with rekindling in them a childlike faith in their 
own core intuitions and talents, like the young 
woman who learned to trust her call to become an 
artist.  On the side of awakening a critical sense, 
the bishops also remark that “contemporary 
consciousness demands truth in the 
communications systems, including the right to 
the image offered by the media and the 
opportunity to correct its manipulation.”12  I make 
something of a campaign out of reminding 
students what it means to live in a society with 
free access to information, in contrast to any 
number of dictatorships where, for example, 
publishing an underground newspaper will end 
you up in prison, where, if you are unlucky 
enough to arrive healthy, you may have vital 
organs removed and sold on the black market.  At 
the same time, you will remember that in the case 
of the death penalty opinion polls, I teach 
students to approach the media with a critical eye 
and to question the question.  Thus, the bishops 
note that a just education “will help them to be no 
longer the object of manipulation by 
communications media or political forces.”13 
 
Forty years later, Justice in the World resonates in 
concrete forms, such as the Africa Faith & Justice 
Network, which was formed in 1983 in direct 
response to the bishops’ document.  Their 
executive director, Fr. Rocco Puopolo, notes that 
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the document “brought the Church’s social 
ministry from the ‘fringe’ … to the very center of 
what it means to be Christian as part of the 
renewal of Vatican II.”  I would add to this 
thought the idea that Catholic higher education, 
especially in its Ignatian expression, has become—
and should continue to become—understood in 
terms of the social ministry of the Church as itself 
a constellation of acts of justice. 
 
I will take just one final quotation from Justice in 
the World:  “The Church recognizes everyone’s 
right to suitable freedom of expression and 
thought.  This includes the right of everyone to be 
heard in a spirit of dialogue which preserves a 
legitimate diversity within the Church.”14 I 
sincerely hope in my teaching, in my academic 
leadership work, and in this essay to be 
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